The Right to Receive Information by Mart, Susan Nevelow
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
Articles Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship 
2003 
The Right to Receive Information 
Susan Nevelow Mart 
University of Colorado Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Internet Law Commons, Legal 
Writing and Research Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Citation Information 
Susan Nevelow Mart, The Right to Receive Information, 95 LAW LIBR. J. 175 (2003), available at 
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/435. 
Copyright Statement 
Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and 
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is 
required. 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact jane.thompson@colorado.edu. 
The Right to Receive Information*
Susan Nevelow Mart**
Ms. Mart examines the legal evolution of the right to receive information, par-
ticularly focusing on its application to libraries, beginning with the Supreme
Court holding in Board of Education v. Pico, and followed by cases that have
considered the meaning of Pico in a variety of library-related contexts.
¶1 Although the First Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the right to free
speech, if you can’t get access to the speech, the value of the guarantee diminishes.
To address the issue of access, the United States Supreme Court developed the the-
ory in Martin v. Struthers1 that there is a constitutional right to receive informa-
tion. Although this case was about door-to-door pamphleteers, many of the major
battles over the right to receive information have arisen in the library context.
Libraries have been the setting for legal battles about student access to books,
removal or retention of “offensive” material, regulation of patron behavior, and
limitations on public access to the Internet. The first Supreme Court case to con-
sider the right to receive information in a library setting was Board of Education
v. Pico.2
¶2 The right to receive information has evolved from its early place as a nec-
essary corollary to the right of free speech3 or as a peripheral or penumbral right4
without which the primary right would be less secure.5 That evolution was severely
impacted by Pico. When the Supreme Court was asked to balance the right to
receive information in school libraries against the discretion of local school boards
to direct the school’s daily operations, the Justices were unable to reach any con-
sensus. The sharply divided opinion left a fractured and incoherent jurisprudence.
* © Susan Nevelow Mart, 2003. 
** Reference Librarian, University of California, Hastings College of Law Library, San Francisco,
California.
1. 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
2. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
3. Martin, 319 U.S. at 143; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 515, 534 (1944). 
4. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482, 483 (1964).
5. The development of corollary rights is perhaps an outgrowth of the early common law rules of con-
struction, codified in some states as maxims of jurisprudence. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3522 (West
1997) (“One who grants a thing is presumed to grant also whatever is essential to its use.”). Maxims
of jurisprudence and rules of statutory construction are not inapplicable when wrestling with consti-
tutional meaning. See Raoul Berger, “Government by Judiciary”: Judge Gibbons’ Argument Ad
Hominem, 59 B.U. L. REV. 783, 804–06 (1979) (citing eminent jurists and commentators who believe
such canons to be applicable to constitutional interpretation).
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¶3 This article begins by examining the legal evolution of the right to receive
information from its inception to Pico, the first case to consider it in a library con-
text. It will then explore the post-Pico jurisprudence as it affects libraries. The plu-
rality opinion in Pico has affected a stream of cases involving libraries, and the
level of legal activity has accelerated with challenges to Internet use in libraries.
¶4 The level of scrutiny the courts will apply to content-based limitations on
speech differs according to the nature of the forum. Public libraries are undergo-
ing a slow constitutional metamorphosis and are being redefined as a public forum
for the receipt of ideas, rather than as a limited public forum for the dissemination
of ideas.6 The new definition may be one way to ensure continued access to a free
flow of information in libraries.
¶5 All libraries that have government funding or that allow public access,
including all law libraries, need to understand the evolving nature of their role as
a public forum; one court has called libraries the “quintessential locus for the exer-
cise of the right to receive information and ideas.”7 The constitutional definition
will affect library autonomy in the provision of unfiltered Internet access, collec-
tion retention, and the scope of library rules that deal with the use of library facil-
ities and with offensive behavior by library patrons.
The Right to Receive Information before Pico
¶6 The earliest direct reference to the right to receive information appears in 1943,
in Martin v. Struthers,8 a case involving the right to receive unsolicited pamphlets
from a door-to-door pamphleteer. The Supreme Court held that “the authors of the
First Amendment knew that novel and unconventional ideas might disturb the
complacent, but they chose to encourage a freedom which they believed essential
if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance. This free-
dom embraces the right to distribute literature . . . and necessarily protects the right
to receive it.”9 The scope of regulation permitted is only of “the time, place, and
manner of distribution.”10 The value being encouraged in the first of the right to
receive cases is the “vigorous enlightenment” of the populace.
¶7 Martin was followed by Thomas v. Collins.11 The Supreme Court in Thomas
held that a labor organizer’s right to speak and the rights of workers “to hear what
176 Law Library Journal [Vol. 95:2
6. See Bernard W. Bell, Filth, Filtering, and the First Amendment: Ruminations on Public Libraries’Use
of Internet Filtering Software, 53 FED. COMM. L. J. 191 (2001). In American Library Ass’n v. United
States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002), prob. juris. noted, United States v. Am. Library Ass’n,
123 S. Ct. 551 (2002) (Mem.), the district court relied on the concept of the government as a facili-
tator of private speech in its analysis.
7. Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1256 (3d Cir. 1992).
8. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
9. Id. at 143 (citation omitted).
10. Id.
11. 323 U.S. 515 (1945).
he had to say,” without first applying for a license from the state, were protected by
the First Amendment.12 The right to receive the information was “necessarily cor-
relative” to the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.13 In Justice Jackson’s
concurrence, he stated: “The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose
public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulat-
ing the press, speech, and religion. In this field every person must be his own watch-
man for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the
true from the false for us.”14 The principle protected in Thomas is the autonomy of
the individual from a paternalistic governmental hegemony of ideas.
¶8 The first case in which the recipient of the speech sought to invalidate a law
as violating the recipient’s First Amendment rights was Lamont v. Postmaster
General.15 In Lamont, a federal statute required the post office to detain and
destroy unsealed mail from foreign countries determined to be communist political
propaganda unless the recipient returned a reply card requesting that the mail be
delivered. Justice Douglas’s opinion was terse and relied in part on Justice
Holmes’s concept of the post office: “The United States may give up the post-office
when it sees fit, but while it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as much a
part of free speech as the right to use our tongues.”16 Justice Brennan’s concurrence
spoke more generally to the framework of the right to receive information:
It is true that the First Amendment contains no specific guarantee of access to publications.
However, the protection of the Bill of Rights goes beyond the specific guarantees to pro-
tect from congressional abridgment those equally fundamental personal rights necessary to
make the express guarantees fully meaningful. (citations omitted) I think the right to
receive publications is such a fundamental right. The dissemination of ideas can accom-
plish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It
would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.17
¶9 This concept of the marketplace of ideas and its buyers and sellers has had
a long life in the history of the right to receive information, and has been quoted
over and over again. But there must be a seller to “buy the ideas,” just as the right
to speak must exist if the right to receive is to be seen as a corollary of that right.
The disjunction between the rights of the speakers and the rights of the recipients
has caused much confusion. The foreign governments in Lamont had no right to
speak.18 But sometimes the right to receive will be upheld regardless of the right
to speak, and sometimes the lack of a right to speak will be dispositive.19
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12. Id. at 534.
13. Id. at 530.
14. Id. at 545 (Jackson, J., concurring).
15. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
16. Id. at 305 (quoting Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ’g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
17. Id. at 308 (citations omitted) (Brennan, J., concurring).
18. Justice Brennan expressly addressed the difference in the position of senders versus receivers when
he observed that the question posed would be more troubling “if the addressees predicated their claim
for relief upon the First Amendment rights of the senders.” Id. at 307 (Brennan, J., concurring). The
addressees had grounded their argument, however, in a personal right to receive information.
19. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
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¶10 In Griswold v. Connecticut,20 the Court, in a plurality opinion, again
upheld the existence of a right to receive information. Planned Parenthood and
other appellants had given information and instruction to married persons con-
cerning contraception, in contravention of Connecticut statutes that criminalized
preventing conception or assisting, abetting, counseling, or otherwise helping a
person prevent conception. “[T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the
First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The right of free-
dom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right
to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read . . . and freedom of inquiry, free-
dom of thought, and freedom to teach. . . . Without those peripheral rights the specific
rights would be less secure.”21 This “penumbral” right is necessary to ensure the
fullest exercise of First Amendment rights.22 In this case, the right to receive infor-
mation exists independent of any right of the speaker to disseminate information.
¶11 In Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC,23 the Supreme Court upheld the fairness
doctrine of the Federal Communications Commission, which was intended to pro-
mote public access to a diversity of information from broadcasting. In another fre-
quently quoted passage, Justice White wrote: “It is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. . . . It is the right
of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and
other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not constitution-
ally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.”24 The collective right of citi-
zens to receive information from a “scarce resource” is the principle in Red Lion.25
¶12 Although possibly more properly designated a right to privacy case, the
Supreme Court relied heavily on the right to receive information in Stanley v.
Georgia,26 a case involving a criminal conviction for the private possession of
obscene material. In overturning the conviction, Justice Marshall stated that “the
right to receive . . . ideas, regardless of their social worth, . . . is fundamental to
our society”27 and that “[w]hatever the power of the state to control public dis-
semination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally prem-
ise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts.”28 The
right to receive information where the information is obscene does not create any
correlative rights on the parts of producers, distributors, or importers.29 But by
Law Library Journal [Vol. 95:2
20. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21. Id. at 482–83.
22. Id.
23. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
24. Id. at 390 (citations omitted).
25. However, all resources (up to the World Wide Web) have been scarce in the sense of being limited.
Not all books get published, not every letter to the editor makes the cut. And in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), the Supreme Court rejected a claim that the govern-
ment has an obligation to ensure newspapers present a variety of views.
26. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
27. Id. at 564 (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 566.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971).
1969, the right to receive information has become a fundamental right, and the
principle in the case harks back to the right of each citizen to be free of any pater-
nalistic imposition of approved viewpoints, first articulated in Martin v. Struthers.
¶13 In Kleindienst v. Mandel,30 however, the speaker’s lack of a First Amend-
ment right was crucial. At the request of the potential recipients, the Supreme
Court reviewed the State Department’s decision to deny another visa to a known
communist activist. While asserting that “[i]t is now well established that the
Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas,”31 the Court lim-
ited its discussion to the narrow issue of whether or not the listeners’ desire to hear
a certain person conferred on them the ability to compel the State Department to
let that person in. The Court upheld the denial, asserting that the State Department
asserted a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for denying the visa.32
¶14 The decision was criticized on First Amendment “right to receive” grounds
by the dissent. Justice Douglas found that the State Department had used its dis-
cretion in an unconstitutional way by basing its decision on the content of the ideas
held by the alien.33 Justice Marshall’s dissent took the position that the denial of
the visa deprived the public of the right to receive and debate the excluded alien’s
ideas, and asserted that the government can only exclude an alien if there is a com-
pelling governmental interest.34
¶15 The theme that the nature of the ideas being regulated were irrelevant and
that the interest of the recipients of information was paramount surfaced again in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen’s Consumer Council,35 a case
where the speaker’s right to speak was pivotal. The case involved consumers of
prescription drugs who sought to invalidate a state statute prohibiting pharmacists
from advertising the price of drugs. The threshold issue was the standing of the
consumers, and Justice Blackmun stated that where a willing speaker exists, the
First Amendment protects both the speaker and the recipient, so that an audience
member can assert a violation of his or her right to receive information.36 Although
the right to receive the information did not exist in the absence of the right of the
speaker to say it, the fact that the audience had an interest in receiving the speech
made it possible for the Court to find that purely commercial speech was protected
by the First Amendment.37 The State’s interest in protecting consumers from the
baneful effects of advertising was paternalistic.
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30. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
31. Id. at 763–64 (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564).
32. Id. at 771.
33. Id. at 774 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 775, 777 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting).
35. 425 U.S. 728, 757 (1976). For a current application of this doctrine, see Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d
629, 645–46 (9th Cir. 2002), where the court balanced the government’s interest in regulating the
right of the speakers to speak to their patients about the medicinal use of marijuana with the need of
the patients to receive the information. As in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the needs of the recip-
ients prevailed.
36. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756.
37. Id. at 763, 765.
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There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach. That alternative is
to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own
best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is
to open the channels of communication rather than to close them. If they are truly open,
nothing prevents the “professional” pharmacist from marketing his own assertedly superior
product, and contrasting it with that of the low-cost, high-volume prescription drug retailer.
But the choice among these alternative approaches is not ours to make or the Virginia
General Assembly’s. It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppress-
ing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First
Amendment makes for us.38
¶16 The principle at issue in this case is once again citizen autonomy from a
paternalistic government. While there is no clear consensus in this group of cases
as to the contours of the right to receive, or whether it exists independently of the
right of the speaker to speak, concern for a vigorous debate of ideas runs through
even those cases, like Kleindienst, where a prohibition on the receipt of ideas is
upheld.
Board of Education v. Pico:39
Access to Information in the School Library
¶17 The Pico decision was supposed to resolve a conflict among the circuit courts
as to whether or not local school boards had unlimited discretion to order books
removed from public school libraries.40 The case involved a school board’s
removal of “filthy” books from a public school library. Affected students sued, and
the Supreme Court held that they had a right to a trial on the merits of their alle-
gations that the school board had violated the students’ First Amendment rights by
removing the books. In the plurality opinion, Justice Brennan (joined by Justices
Marshall and Stevens) wrote that while “courts should not ‘intervene in the reso-
lution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems’ unless
basic constitutional values are directly and sharply implicate[d],”41 the right to
receive information did implicate the students’ free speech rights. He observed that
the First Amendment protects not only the right to self-expression, but also guar-
antees “public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information
and ideas.”42 Moreover, the “right [to receive information] is an inherent corollary
Law Library Journal [Vol. 95:2
38. Id. at 770.
39. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
40. In Presidents Council, District 25 v. Community School Board 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972), and
Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Board of Directors, 475 F. Supp. 615 (D. Vt. 1979), the
courts found that there was no First Amendment right to receive information that would prevent
removal of “offensive” books in a school library. But Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District,
541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976), Right to Read Defense Committee v. School Committee of Chelsea, 454
F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978), and Salvail v. Nashua Board of Education, 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D. N.H.
1979), all upheld the students’ right to receive information.
41. Pico, 457 U.S. at 866 (citation omitted).
42. Id. (citation omitted). 
of the rights of free speech and press that are explicitly guaranteed by the Consti-
tution, in two senses. First, the right to receive ideas follows ineluctably from the
sender’s First Amendment right to send them. . . . More importantly, the right to
receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient’s meaningful exercise of his
own rights of speech, press, and political freedom.”43 Because access to books and
ideas prepares students for “active and effective participation” in the “contentious
society” of which students will one day be members, school libraries are an impor-
tant place to safeguard the right to receive information.44
¶18 Two aspects of the plurality opinion are important in developing the right
to receive: both the right to receive information and the right to send information
are conceived of as parts of the constitutional right of access identified by previ-
ous opinions, and the right to receive information is a corollary of the right to send
ideas.45 This means that where there is no right to send information, there is no
right to receive it. As pointed out in the dissent of Justice Rehnquist, there is no
right to have information in the library, so only confusion is created by viewing the
rights of the recipients as dependent on the rights of the senders.46 In the plurality
view, the principle being protected is the preparation of citizens for vigorous par-
ticipation in the democratic debate. To that end, you can remove books for a proper
motive (respondents had conceded it would be proper to remove books because of
educational suitability) but not for an improper motive, such as preventing access
to ideas.47
¶19 Justice Blackmun concurred with the result in Pico but did not agree that
students had a First Amendment right to receive ideas in the school library; the
school board’s discretion should only be limited by “an intentional attempt to
shield students from certain ideas that officials find politically distasteful.”48 He
did not deny that there was a First Amendment right to receive information; the
dispute was as to its applicability to the public school library. Justice White did not
even reach this question; he merely wanted to affirm the judgment that there was
an unresolved factual issue and send the case back for trial.49 Three separate dis-
sents were filed, bemoaning the potential for injection of federal judges’ opinions
into the educational decision-making process. The Pico decision, however, has
been used as a statement of the contours of the right to receive information in a
variety of contexts more far-reaching than the public school library. It is therefore
frustrating that the opinion left the rights of the recipients “ineluctably” inter-
twined with the rights of the senders of information.
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43. Id. at 867 (citation omitted).
44. Id. at 868.
45. The right to receive ideas is slightly more important, as receipt of information is necessary for the
recipient’s own exercise of the rights of free speech, press, and political freedom. Id. at 867.
46. See id. at 912 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
47. See id. at 871, 874.
48. Id. at 882 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 883 (White, J., concurring).
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Post-Pico: The Right to Receive Information in the Library
Limits on Library Autonomy—Internet Filtering and Problem Patrons
¶20 The constitutionality of Internet filtering software on library computer termi-
nals and the struggle to regulate the behavior of the problem patron are two (some-
times interrelated) areas of the law affecting libraries where Pico has continued
vitality. Although the lack of a majority opinion in Pico has meant that lower
courts can only look to it for guidance, the plurality opinion continues to shape the
law. In Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of Loudoun County Library,50
the issue was whether a public library could, without violating the First
Amendment, enforce content-based restrictions on access to Internet speech by fil-
tering. The court adopted the distinction made in Pico between acquiring infor-
mation (adding the Internet connection) and removing it (filtering the Internet
connection).51 In analyzing Pico, it cobbled together a majority holding about First
Amendment rights to receive information in public libraries and held that Pico, to
the extent applicable, “stands for the proposition that the First Amendment applies
to, and limits, the discretion of a public library to place content-based restrictions
on access to constitutionally protected materials within its collection.”52
Mainstream Loudoun also held that the public library was a limited public forum
and rejected the argument that Internet filtering was a valid “time, place, or man-
ner” regulation.53
¶21 Mainstream Loudoun’s accentuation of the difference between the acqui-
sition and removal of information affirmed the rule that the government has no
duty to provide information (no duty to transmit information) but once it accepts
that duty, it must do so in a constitutional manner (must limit discretion to prevent
receipt of information).54 Such an analysis is one step on the way to recognizing
the right to know as a legal right independent of the more traditional right of the
speaker to communicate. There are good reasons to recognize a separate right.
“The interests of the listener may not always coincide with the interests of the
communicator. The communicator may not always be in a position to assert his
rights. The admitted interests of the recipients will be entitled to greater weight
when they are based upon an independent legal foundation, rather than being
merely derivative of the rights of the communicator.”55
¶22 The dissemination of information in libraries is a function of the govern-
ment in its role of expending “funds to encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers,” where courts prohibit viewpoint discrimination and closely scrutinize
Law Library Journal [Vol. 95:2
50. 2 F. Supp. 2d 783 (E.D. Va. 1998).
51. Id. at 794.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Id.
54. “Similarly, in this case, the Library Board need not offer Internet access, but, having chosen to pro-
vide it, must operate the service within the confines of the First Amendment.” Id. at 797.
55. Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. L. Q. 1, 2.
other content-based limitations on speech.56 The public library’s role is as a “facil-
itator rather than [a] channel for government speech,” so the government should
not have strict control over the material it makes available to patrons of a public
library.57 Public libraries are more analogous to universities as settings for wide-
ranging, free inquiry.58 Bell analogizes the role of libraries for listeners to the role
of streets and parks for speakers. Libraries are archetypal traditional government-
funded loci for acquiring knowledge, just as streets and parks are archetypal gov-
ernment-funded loci for speaking.59
¶23 Kreimer v. Bureau of Police offered a view of the library as “the quintes-
sential locus of the receipt of information”60 and a place for the “exercise of the
right to receive information.”61 In Kreimer, the circuit court wrestled with the man-
ner in which libraries could regulate patron behavior without denying access to
information protected by the patron’s constitutional right to receive information.
Initially finding that a First Amendment issue was raised by the regulations, the
court held that:
Our review of the Supreme Court’s decisions confirms that the First Amendment does not
merely prohibit the government from enacting laws that censor information, but addition-
ally encompasses the positive right of public access to information and ideas. Pico signi-
fies that, consistent with other First Amendment principles, the right to receive information
is not unfettered and may give way to significant countervailing interests. At the threshold,
however, this right, first recognized in Martin and refined in later First Amendment
jurisprudence, includes the right to some level of access to a public library, the quintes-
sential locus of the receipt of information.62
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56. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995). In Rosenberger, a uni-
versity student organization which published a newspaper with a Christian editorial viewpoint
brought action against the university challenging its denial of funds from a fund created by the uni-
versity to defray the printing costs of publications of student groups. The university’s argument that
viewpoint discrimination was proper where the university was expending “funds to encourage a diver-
sity of views” was soundly rejected by the Court. Id.
57. Bell, supra note 6, at 220.
58. Both have been referred to in these terms. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 915 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Unlike university or public libraries, elementary and secondary school
libraries are not designed for freewheeling inquiry . . . .”); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840 (“[S]tudent
life . . . includes the necessity of wide-ranging speech and inquiry and . . . student expression is an
integral part of the University’s educational mission.”). 
59. Bell, supra note 6, at 220. This analysis was adopted by the district court in American Library Ass’n
v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 466–67 (E.D. Pa. 2002), prob. juris. noted, United States v. Am.
Library Ass’n, 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002) (Mem.), discussed infra ¶ 27. 
60. 958 F.2d 1242, 1255 (3d Cir. 1992).
61. Id. at 1256.
62. Id. at 1255. See also Neinast v. Bd. of Trustees, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1043–44 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (cit-
ing Kreimer and upholding the library’s eviction of a barefoot patron on the ground that the library’s
eviction procedures regulating patrons not wearing shoes was a reasonable “time, place, and manner
restriction”). But see Armstrong v. D.C. Public Library, 154 F. Supp. 2d 67, 77–78 (D.C. 2001)
(applying a “narrowly tailored” standard of review to invalidate an appearance regulation as uncon-
stitutionally vague; the regulation deprived a homeless person of all access to the library without
informing the patron of the standard of appearance that would assure access).
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¶24 That access right is protected in differing ways depending on the nature of
the public space involved.63 After analyzing Perry, the Kreimer court found that the
public library was a limited public forum which “‘the state has opened for use by
the public as a place for expressive activity.’ Although the government is not
required to open or indefinitely retain the open nature of these fora, once it does
so the government is bound by the same limitations as exist in the traditional pub-
lic forum context . . . where only ‘reasonable time, place and manner regulations
are permissible, and a content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effec-
tuate a compelling state interest.’”64 Traditional forum analysis is directed at the
speaker’s interest: the traditional public fora (streets, parks, and public sidewalks)
are protected places for public assembly where the government’s attempts to
restrict speech are severely curtailed and prior restraint of content is prohibited.65
¶25 If the view of the recipient of information is analyzed, then the library as
the “quintessential public forum for the receipt of information” is directly analo-
gous to the park or the street, and from the recipient’s point of view, is a traditional,
not a limited public forum.66 By defining the library as the “quintessential” locus,
Kreimer has set the stage for just such an analysis.67
¶26 So ingrained a part of constitutional lore has the right to receive informa-
tion become that in striking down certain provisions of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996,68 the Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU69 discussed an adult’s
“right to receive” information protected by the First Amendment without so much
as a citation:
We are persuaded that the CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires
when a statute regulates the content of speech. In order to deny minors access to potentially
harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have
a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another. That burden on adult speech
is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the
legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve.70
¶27 In American Library Ass’n v. United States,71 a First Amendment chal-
Law Library Journal [Vol. 95:2
63. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educator’s Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1983).
64. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1255–56 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45, 46).
65. Id. at 1255.
66. Bell, supra note 6, at 220–21.
67. See Marilyn Maloney & Julia Morgan, Rock and a Hard Place: The Public Library’s Dilemma in
Providing Access to Legal Materials on the Internet While Restricting Access to Illegal Materials, 24
HAMLINE L. REV. 199, 215–16 (2001). The authors suggest that the Kreimer analysis is useful in medi-
ating Internet use in the library. By regulating behavior (rather than content), inappropriate or illegal
Internet acts in the library can be regulated as inappropriate activities in the library have always been
regulated.
68. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 56, 133 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a)(1), 223(d)
(2000)).
69. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
70. Reno, 521 U.S. at 874.
71. 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002), prob. juris. noted, United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 123 S.
Ct. 551 (2002) (Mem.).
lenge to those provisions of the Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA) requir-
ing a public library to install Internet filtering software as a condition of receiving
certain federal funds,72 the district court adopted Reno’s strict scrutiny analysis for
the library setting:
Where the state provides access to a “vast democratic forum[ ],”. . . open to any member
of the public to speak on subjects “as diverse as human thought,” the state’s decision selec-
tively to exclude from the forum speech whose content the state disfavors is subject to strict
scrutiny, as such exclusions risk distorting the marketplace of ideas that the state has facil-
itated. Application of strict scrutiny finds further support in the extent to which public
libraries’ provision of Internet access uniquely promotes First Amendment values in a man-
ner analogous to traditional public fora such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, in which con-
tent-based restrictions are always subject to strict scrutiny.73
The district court in American Library Ass’n did not adopt the view of the library
as the place where information is received, but likened the Internet to the sidewalk
or park where speech is promoted, specifically holding that “[i]n providing its
patrons with Internet access a public library creates a forum for the facilitation of
speech” open to any member of the public.74 Because filters both overblock legit-
imate protected speech and underblock some sexually explicit speech that is not
protected, filtering the Internet violates the First Amendment.75 Although the rul-
ing in the lawsuit enjoined enforcement of the CIPA provisions linking federal
finding to Internet filtering, the message was clear: libraries have a number of less
restrictive methods to enforce rules prohibiting patrons from accessing illegal con-
tent than complete Internet filtering, and must use them.76
Book Removal and Board Control
¶28 Pico has continued to play a pivotal role in the public library setting. In Sund
v. City of Wichita Falls, Texas,77 the court invalidated a library board resolution
directing the removal of several childrens’ books to the adult section as violating
the plaintiffs’ federal and state constitutional rights to receive information.78 It
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72. Pub. L. No. 106-554, §§ 1712(a)(2), 1712(b), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-340, 2763A-346–49 (2000)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f), 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6) (2000)).
73. Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 409 (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 868, 870).
74. Id. at 464.
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and by the time this article is published, the decision in American Library Ass’n may be vacated.
Nevertheless, its analysis of the current state of First Amendment jurisprudence is still instructive. The
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76. Id. at 483–84 (suggesting that providing patrons the option of using a filtered or unfiltered terminal,
providing separate filtered and unfiltered terminals, using privacy screens, or using the “tap-on-the-
shoulder” request to stop viewing improper material are all less intrusive alternatives).
77. 121 F. Supp. 2d 530 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
78. Citing Reno and Pico, the court held that the First Amendment and the Texas Constitution “indis-
putably protect the right to receive information.” Id. at 547 (citations omitted).
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found that the library was a limited public forum, citing Kreimer, and that Pico
applied “with even greater force” in the public library.79
In the school library context, both Case v. Unified School District No. 23380
and Virgil v. School Board81 used Pico for guidance. Case involved a decision to
remove books, and Pico, though not binding, still persuaded the court to find the
book removal unconstitutional.82 Virgil involved a curricular decision, not a school
library decision, and the court felt that the decision in Hazelwood School District
v. Kuhlmeier83 trumped Pico,84 and extended the holding in Kuhlmeier to the deci-
sion to use a particular textbook. In Kuhlmeier, which involved the removal by
school authorities of materials from a high school journalism class’s newspaper,
the Court held:
[E]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the
style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. . . . It is only when
the decision to censor a school-sponsored publication, theatrical production or other vehi-
cle of student expression has no valid educational purpose that the First Amendment is so
“directly and sharply implicated” as to require judicial intervention to protect students’
constitutional rights.85
¶29 The right to receive information does not mean that citizens have unlim-
ited access to all the information the government possesses.86 Even in cases involv-
ing an otherwise willing or available source of information, the Supreme Court has
upheld restrictions on the public’s right of access.87 But in Student Press Law
Center v. Alexander,88 student journalists successfully argued that the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), authorizing withdrawal of federal
funding from any university that discloses to the public personally identifiable
information contained in campus police reports, violated even the limited concep-
tion of the scope of constitutional protections Pico afforded the right to receive
information. “In light of the universities’ willingness (absent coercion to the con-
trary) to release campus crime reports in full, the Government must assert some
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79. Id. at 548 (citations omitted).
80. 895 F. Supp. 1463 (D. Kan. 1995).
81. 677 F. Supp. 1547 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
82. Case, 895 F. Supp. at 1468.
83. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). The right to receive information is only discussed by the dissent in Kuhlmeier.
Id. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. Virgil, 677 F. Supp. at 1551 (citation omitted) (“In light of the recent decision . . . in Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier . . ., this Court need not decide whether the plurality decision in Pico
may logically be extended to optional curriculum materials. Kuhlmeier resolves any doubts as to the
appropriate standard to be applied whenever a curriculum decision is subject to first amendment
review.”).
85. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273 (citations omitted).
86. See Zemel v. Rusk 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
87. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (upholding a restriction against interviewing prison
inmates).
88. 778 F. Supp. 1227 (D.D.C. 1991).
interest that outweighs the public’s First Amendment right to receive the informa-
tion.”89
¶30 In Brown v. Board of Regents of University of Nebraska,90 a suit was filed
against the University of Nebraska contesting the cancellation of a controversial
movie by the director of a state-operated art theater on campus. The district court
held that the cancellation of the film violated the constitutional rights of those who
wished to see it. The court’s reliance on Pico was based on two additional facts
that added weight to the plurality view. First, the denial of information in this
instance occurred on a college campus, rather than in a junior or senior high school
library. Second, in separate dissents in Pico, both Justice Rehnquist91 and Justice
O’Connor92 noted the special role of government when it was acting as educator.
In Brown, the facts showed only a slight involvement of the government as an edu-
cator on a college campus. The involvement was slight because the theater show-
ings were for the public at large and were not part of the academic program of the
university. The intrusion by the government as a sovereign was direct.93
¶31 So Pico has continued to have enormous vitality; later courts have looked
to bits and pieces of it to cobble together a viewpoint that applies to the facts actu-
ally before the deciding court.
Conclusion
¶32 The right to receive information has arisen in more contexts than can be cov-
ered in one article.94 Even in the context of public and school libraries, it is clear
there is no consensus view on the scope of the right to receive information or the
standard of review that will apply to the right. But the constitutional right to receive
information has only received increased vitality in the context of cyberspace.95
¶33 The problem for First Amendment analysis created by the fractured case
law might be partially resolved by reference to the theory advanced by Robert C.
Post and applied to the Internet access cases by Matthew Kline.96 The appropriate
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BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 347, 357–65 (1999), citing Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L. J.
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level of scrutiny to be applied to library filtering cases can be based on a distinc-
tion between the managerial domain and the public discourse domain.97
The first inquiry involves characterizing the speech and determining whether it is part of
the democratic social domain called “public discourse,” or whether it is “located in a dif-
ferent kind of social formation, which may be termed the ‘managerial domain.’” The sec-
ond inquiry focuses on the government regulation involved and distinguishes between two
different types of such action: “‘conduct rule[s]’ for the government of citizens,” which can
be understood as limits on public discourse, and “‘decision rules’ for the internal direction
of government officials,” which can be understood as “a form of state participation in the
marketplace of ideas.”98
¶34 The result of each inquiry has different implications for First Amendment
analysis. “Because the democratic legitimacy of the state depends on public dis-
course, ‘the First Amendment jealously safeguards public discourse from state
censorship.’”99 The democratic, First Amendment value, which the speech pro-
motes, trumps governmental will. “In contrast, ‘[w]ithin managerial domains, the
state organizes its resources so as to achieve specified ends.’ Content-based regu-
lations of speech within those managerial domains do not violate the First
Amendment, . . . ‘so long as they are necessary to accomplish legitimate manage-
rial ends.’”100
¶35 According to Kline, Reno and Pico can also be understood, in part, as
falling on either side of the public discourse/managerial domain divide. “In Reno,
the CDA constrained an important ‘site for the forging of an independent public
opinion to which democratic legitimacy demands that the state remain perennially
responsive.’ Thus, the regulation merited strict judicial scrutiny, and the Internet
communication [needed] ‘jealous safeguarding from state censorship.’”101 The
district court decision in American Library Ass’n v. United States fits easily into
this analysis: providing Internet access falls on the public discourse end of the
spectrum and merits strict scrutiny.
¶36 In Pico, on the other hand, the “school board’s legitimate managerial 
authority to inculcate [the] nation’s children” would justify the board’s decision 
“to establish a curriculum and remove books that could undermine it.”102 Kline 
cites Justice O’Connor’s dissent for this proposition, and so sidesteps the lack of a
majority on this issue.103 It is fair to say, however, that the school’s undoubted man-
agerial role caused the split in opinion, and that, as to schools, the debate is still
going on. 
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99. Id. (quoting Post, supra note 96, at 153). 
100. Id. at 358 (quoting Post, supra note 95, at 164, 170).
101. Id. (quoting Post, supra note 96, at 153).
102. Id. (citing Post, supra note 96, at 165–67 & 165 n.92; Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 862–75
(1982)).
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¶37 What Pico means for public libraries as providers of open access to infor-
mation and for law libraries as providers of open access to legal information is still
being decided. But until the Supreme Court issues its final word, the constitutional
right to receive information limits a library’s right to filter the Internet, to remove
“offensive” books, to bar “offensive” speakers or films, and to have anything other
than a carefully crafted, content-neutral policy on patron behavior and dress.
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